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Richards: Prosecutorial Immunity - The Wyoming Supreme Court's Failure to A

CASENOTES
PROSECUTORIAL
IMMUNITY-The
Wyoming
Supreme
Court's failure to adequately address relevant public
policies results in
a mistaken grant of absolute
prosecutorial immunity. Cooney v. Park County, 792 P.2d
1287 (Wyo. 1990).
Thomas Cooney was placed on five years supervised probation
following a guilty plea in the District Court of Park County to a
charge of writing checks on insufficient funds on January 24, 1985.1
Supervision of Cooney's probation was assigned to Riverton probation
officer Cindy Johnson. 2 In September 1985 Cooney received permission from Johnson to relocate to Bairoil, Wyoming. 3 Ms. Johnson sent
Cooney's file to Rawlins, the office in charge of the Bairoil area; however, she mistakenly listed Cooney as moving to La Barge.4 The file
was forwarded to the La Barge area office in Evanston and assigned to
Robert Mayor.5 Mayor attempted to locate Cooney in La Barge from
October 1985 to January 1986.6
Although Cooney was not contacted by probation officers after
moving to Bairoil, he kept in touch with either Johnson or the Rawlins office.7 After failing to locate Cooney, Mayor called Johnson in
January 1986 and told her of Cooney's absence.8 Unexplainedly, Johnson told Mayor that Cooney had moved to La Barge in October and
she had not heard from him since.9
On January 24, 1986, Mayor called Park County assistant prosecutor Chris White and told White that Cooney had moved without
permission and had not been in contact with probation officials since
October 1985.10 White told Mayor to prepare a petition to revoke
probation.1
1. Cooney v. Park County, 792 P.2d 1287, 1288 (Wyo. 1990). Thomas Russell
Cooney pled guilty and was placed on probation under Wyoming Statutes section 7-13203 (1977) (renumbered to Wyoming Statutes section 7-13-301 (1987)). The statute
permits the court to defer further proceedings without entering a judgment of guilt or
conviction. The court then places the defendant on probation, for not more than five
years. If the defendant violates any probation provision, the court may enter the conviction and impose sentence under the guilty plea to the original charge. Cooney, 792
P.2d at 1306 n.7 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting).
2. Id. at 1288.
3. Id. The majority misspelled "Baroil;" the correct spelling is "Bairoil."
4. Id. Bairoil is in Sweetwater County, but is served by Rawlins because of its
proximity. La Barge is in Uinta County.

5. Id.
6. Id. at 1288-89.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1289.
9. Id.
10. Id.

11. Id. Cooney's allegations concerning the prosecutor's actions are accepted as
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On January 29, 1986, Johnson realized her mistake and called
Mayor, telling him that Cooney had permission to move to Bairoil and
that Cooney had been in contact with her since the move."2 Mayor
relayed this information to White, who advised Mayor to continue
with the petition to revoke probation." After receiving the signed petition from Mayor, White presented the petition to the District Court
of Park County which issued a bench warrant for Cooney's arrest on
February 7, 1986."4
Cooney filed monthly reports with the Rawlins probation office in
February and March 1986.11 When Cooney's job ended in March, he
found permanent work in Glasgow, Montana. Thereafter Cooney requested and received, from the Rawlins probation office, written permission to relocate to Glasgow, Montana.1" In the process of this
move, Cooney was arrested on March 15, 1986, under authority of the
bench warrant, and taken to the Park County jail.1 7 Cooney spent
thirty-eight days in jail without a hearing, until the district court denied the petition to revoke, released Cooney, and restored him to
probation."5
Cooney later filed a 42 U.S.C. section 1983"1 damages claim
against White.2" White answered with a Wyoming Rules of Civil Pro-

true in a Wyo. R. Crv. P. 12(b)(6) motion, and the dismissal is based solely upon the
pleadings. Id. at 1290.
12. Id. at 1289. The Riverton officer, Johnson, received completed forms from
Cooney stating that no one from Rawlins had yet contacted him in Bairoil. This information apparently alerted the Riverton officer of her recent error. Id. at 1306 n.7
(Urbigkit, J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 1289.
14. Id.
15. Id.

16. Id. Cooney worked as a drilling rig deck hand. Id. at 1306 n.7 (Urbigkit, J.,
dissenting).
17. Id. at 1289. Cooney was arrested by the Wyoming Highway Patrol in the
Bairoil area and subsequently jailed 250 miles away in the Park County jail. Id.
18. Id. The allegations include a statement that the public defender requested
Cooney's release pending a hearing, but that White refused to honor that request. It is
unclear whether the public defender sought release from the court and White successfully contested that release or whether the defender's request was addressed directly to
White, in which case it was not within White's power to grant Cooney's release. Id.
19. Id. The basis for Cooney's claim against White is a federal statute held to be
within state court jurisdiction under Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 535 (1974) and
Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283 (1980), and which states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
20. Cooney, 792 P.2d at 1288. Other parties to the action were Thomas Cooney's
wife, Lora John Cooney, as co-plaintiff and the State of Wyoming, the Wyoming Department of Probation and Parole, and Robert Mayor as co-defendants. Suit was
brought against the co-defendants under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act.
WYO. STAT. §§ 1-39-101 to -108 (1988). Claims against these co-defendants were dis-
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cedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss under which, even if the allegations
are accepted as being true, the plaintiff still fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted."1 White's motion was made on the theory
that absolute prosecutorial immunity precluded civil action against
him."2 The district court granted the motion, and the Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed on appeal.2 s
The Wyoming Supreme Court applied judicially created
prosecutorial immunity to preclude an injured party from exercising a
statutorily guaranteed right to seek damages for deprivation of civil
rights.2 4 This casenote examines the Wyoming Supreme Court's interpretation of the United States Supreme Court's "functional analysis"
of prosecutorial activities, and disagrees with the Cooney decision permitting absolute immunity, as opposed to qualified immunity, as a
complete defense to civil suits arising from activities not within the
required discretionary duties of prosecutor.2 5
BACKGROUND

The evolution of immunity from civil suit began with the common law application of immunity to judges. 26 The United States Supreme Court examined the principle of absolute judicial immunity in
Bradley v.Fisher, in 1871." The Bradley Court agreed with the rationale supporting the English common law which granted absolute
missed by the district court based on a finding that there was no waiver of immunity
under the Claims Act, and the district court was affirmed on appeal. Id. This casenote
does not deal with the Claims Act.
21. Cooney, 792 P.2d at 1288. Wyo. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) differs from Wvo. R. Civ. P.
56 (summary judgment) in that the former is a motion based solely on the pleadings
and may only occur prior to trial. The latter motion may be heard at any time and
may or may not be based upon supplementary affidavits.
22. Cooney, 792 P.2d at 1288.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Immunity denotes existence of a special privilege. In litigation the grant of
immunity relieves defendants of some degree of obligation to offer evidence in defense
of charges. This privilege signifies that the defendant has acted to further such an
important social interest that he is entitled to protection even at the expense of damage to the plaintiff. Absolute immunity differs from qualified immunity. A grant of
absolute immunity defeats a suit, on a 12(b)(6) motion, at the outset without any
showing of evidence beyond the pleadings. A grant of qualified immunity requires a
showing of a reasonable belief and good faith, forming the basis for the defendant's
actions, as conditions of a summary judgment in the defendant's favor. W. KEETON,
PROSSER AND KErON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 16, at 109 (5th ed. 1984); see also Imbler
v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 n.13 (1976). For a well written comment on good faith,
see Comment, The Defense of "Good Faith" Under Section 1983, 1971 WASH. U.L.Q.

666.
26. For a detailed discussion of the English evolution of judicial immunity, see
Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. Rv.
1 (1963).

27. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871). Bradley was the trial of the doctor who rendered medical assistance to John Wilkes Booth after the assassination of President
Lincoln. The trial judge disbarred the doctor's lawyer under disputed circumstances,
and the lawyer filed a civil action against the judge. Id. at 337.
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immunity to judges acting within their jurisdictions. 8 The Court con-

curred that the proper administration of justice called for judicial officers to be free of concern over personal consequences as a matter of
public policy."' The Court reasoned that without absolute immunity a
judge would continually be subjected to suits brought by losing parties, requiring the judge to go before a second judge to show support
for his actions. If the aggrieved party should lose again, the second
judge could similarly be sued and forced to offer proof supporting his
decision.30 Thus, the creation of absolute immunity in American jurisprudence was born of English common law and based upon public
policy concerns."
Twenty-five years later, the Indiana Supreme Court extended absolute immunity to a prosecutor.32 The state prosecutor presented evidence to a grand jury concerning an arson investigation and gave the
names of John Mullins and George Griffith, thought to be criminally
involved.33 The grand jury found no evidence linking Griffith to the
charges, and requested that the prosecutor exclude Griffith's name
from the indictment.3 ' The prosecutor, however, listed both parties,
and as a result Griffith was subjected to the rigors of defending the
criminal charge.3 1 In appellate review of Griffith's civil suit for damages, the court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the case. 36 The
court reasoned that the position of state prosecutor is a judicial position similar to a judge, created by the constitution of the state and
entrusted with the administration of justice, and therefore should be
similarly immune from suit. 7 The extension of absolute immunity is
based upon the similarity of discretionary duties between the judge
and prosecutor.3 8 The court held that whenever duties of a judicial
nature, requiring the exercise of discretionary judgment, are imposed
upon a public officer, he is exempt from all civil liability in performance of those duties, regardless of the motives and manner in which
the duties are performed.3"
The United States Supreme Court first addressed federal
prosecutorial immunity in Yaselli v. Goff, in 1927.40 In Yaseili, an at28. Id. at 347.

29. Id.
30. Id. at 348-49.

31. Id. at 347. American judicial absolute immunity was limited to judges acting
within the subject matter jurisdiction of their court. Id. at 354.

32. Griffith v. Slinkard, 146 Ind. 117, 44 N.E. 1001 (1896).
33. Id. at 1001. Mullins and Griffith were charged with arson and intent to defraud an insurance company after Mullins' barn was destroyed by fire. The prosecutor
sought charges of arson and complicity against Griffith. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. An indictment containing both names was submitted to the grand jury
foreman, who signed the bill without reading it. Id.

36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 1002.
Id.
Id.
Id.

40. Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir.), aff'd per curiam, 275 U.S. 503 (1927).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol26/iss1/12

4

Richards: Prosecutorial Immunity - The Wyoming Supreme Court's Failure to A
1991

CASENOTES

torney secured appointment as Assistant Attorney General of the
United States, for the purpose of maliciously prosecuting the plaintiff.41 In the plaintiff's suit for damages, the district court reviewed
the policies supporting immunity grants to judges and found that the
same policy considerations called for an extension of absolute immunity to prosecutors." The district court held that a prosecutor is immune from civil action because persons in official positions closely related to judicial offices should have the freedom to discharge duties
imposed upon them by law, without fear of personal liability." 44The
United States Supreme Court affirmed on authority of Bradley.
State prosecutors were granted absolute immunity from suit in
section 1983 actions, in certain circumstances, as a result of the
United States Supreme Court holding in Imbler v. Pachtman." The
Court examined the history of the absolute immunity afforded judges
and qualified immunity (requiring a showing of good faith or probable
cause) commonly granted to other public officials. 4 The Court referred to numerous lower court decisions granting absolute immunity
to state prosecutors for actions taken while in performance of their
official duties, and found that a state common law immunity for prosecutors existed."7 The Court stated that the grant of absolute immunity was dependent upon a finding that the prosecutorial activities
were "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal
process, and thus were functions to which the reasons for absolute immunity apply with force.'" The Court reasoned that subjecting a
prosecutor to the threat of civil liability for malicious prosecution
whenever a criminal charge fails to win a conviction or is overturned

41. Id. at 406. The district court considered separately the issue whether immunity would attach when the prosecutor attained his office for the specific purpose of
maliciously prosecuting the plaintiff. The court held that once the appointment was
made, immunity would attach regardless of the impetus for the appointment. Id. at

407.
42. Id. at 402, 404 (citing 2 T. COOLv,COOLEY ON TORTS 756, 795 (3d ed. 1906)).
43. Id. at 406.
44. Yaselli v. Goff, 275 U.S. 503 (1927) (per curiam).
45. 424 U.S. 409 (1976). A state prosecutor knowingly used false testimony and
suppressed material evidence favorable to the criminal defendant in obtaining an illegal conviction. Id. at 411-13.
46. Id. at 418-19.
47. Id. at 427. The Imbler Court stated common law concerns supporting absolute
immunity to be: (1) The threat of liability arising on a failure to convict would influ-

ence a prosecutor's conduct toward fewer prosecutions. Id. at 423-24. (2) The potential
for a large expenditure of time, away from serving the criminal justice system, defending suits brought by defendants whose prosecutions are defeated or whose convictions
are overturned. Id. at 425. (3) The greater difficulty the prosecutor would face

in meet-

ing the standards of qualified immunity than other executive or administrative officials. Id. at 425-26. (4) The possibility that a prosecutor would withhold post-conviction evidence that may overturn the verdict and therefore subject the prosecutor to
liability. Id. at 427. (5) The knowledge that a prosecutor may be subjected to a liability
suit if a conviction is overturned may influence a judge toward fewer justifiable reversals. Id. at 428.
48. Id. at 430.
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would be counter to public policy principles. 4 9 The Court concluded
that the possibility of such litigation would deter the diligent performance of official duties and adversely influence the prosecutor's decision-making functions. 5
While the Court's holding was limited to the grant of absolute
immunity for activities involving the initiation and presentation of the
state's case, the reasoning developed a "functional analysis" that has
been adopted by the lower courts in attempting to define the scope of
absolute immunity.5 ' The analysis calls for an examination of the
functional nature of the challenged prosecutorial activities and requires an intimacy of the activities with the criminal process, where
absolute immunity would be fully supported by public policies."
The Wyoming Supreme Court adopted the Imbler "functional
analysis" in Blake v. Rupe. 2 A juror filed a damages suit against
Blake, a county prosecuting attorney who charged the juror with perjury without fully investigating the allegations.6 The juror had not
responded to inquiries concerning felony convictions during jury selection because he had been granted full pardon.56 The juror alleged tortious conduct during the prosecutor's investigation of the allegations,
a prosecutorial function not considered in Imbler."I However, the
court emphasized footnote language from Imbler suggesting that certain preparatory activities for initiation of criminal proceedings are
functions of a state's advocate that require exercise of discretion similar to that of a judge and deserving of absolute immunity."7
The court concluded that absolute immunity does not adhere to
the office of prosecutor, but that the functional relationship of the activity to the preparation for a criminal prosecution would determine
whether absolute immunity attached.58 The court concluded that investigative activities necessary to determine whether to pursue a criminal prosecution were within the absolute immunity umbrella, even if
performed negligently or with improper motives, and absolute immunity from civil suit was proper.5 9

49. Id. at 424.

50. Id.
51. Id. at 430-31; see McCarthy v. Mayo, 827 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1987); Campbell

v. Maine, 787 F.2d 776 (1st Cir. 1986); cf. Robinson v. Via, 821 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1987);
Edgar v. Wagner, 101 Nev. 226, 699 P.2d 110 (1985).
52. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430. See supra note 47.
53. 651 P.2d 1096 (Wyo. 1982).
54. Id. at 1098.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1099.
57. Id. at 1101 (citing Imbler, 424 U.S. at 433 n.33).
58. Blake, 651 P.2d at 1102.

59. Id. at 1105.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol26/iss1/12
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PRINCIPAL CASE

In Cooney, the alleged civil rights violations occurred subsequent
to prosecution of the criminal charge. 0 This presented the Wyoming
Supreme Court with the task of applying the "functional analysis" to
prosecutorial activities taking place within a different time frame than
previously considered. The issue required the court to deal with the
undefined limits on the scope of absolute immunity, a task made more
difficult due to the limited holding in Imbler.1
The court acknowledged the lack of statutory immunity from civil
suit, but stated that common law immunity was available to prosecutors in certain situations.2 The Cooney court determined that the Imbler "functional analysis" adopted by the Blake court was the proper
test to resolve whether the prosecutor's activities in Cooney fell within
the ambit of absolute immunity. 3 The court stated that if the prosecutor's activities challenged in Cooney were administrative, rather
than part of the prosecutor's role as state's advocate in a criminal proceeding, the prosecutor could be granted only qualified immunity and
would be required to show probable cause for his actions."
The court invoked the Imbler principle that the purpose of the
"functional analysis" is to decide whether the activities are "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.""
The elements of the "functional analysis" therefore require that there
be a "criminal process" involved, that the process is in the "judicial
phase," and that the activities challenged are "intimately associated"
with that judicial phase." The court looked to the statutory definition
of probation to determine that the sentencing court retained authority
over the probationer in order to regulate his probation. The court
declared that a judge's sentencing duties were not concluded and a
case was not closed until probation was revoked or completed. 8
The court noted that a presiding judge has the option of directing
the prosecuting attorney to investigate and report on factors relevant
60. Cooney, 792 P.2d at 1287. Cooney had been before the court, pleaded guilty,

and received five years probation. Cooney had been on probation for one year and
eight days when Mayor's probation revocation petition was filed. Id. at 1306 n.7

(Urbigkit, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 1293.

62. Id. at 1291; see Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193 (1985); Imbler v. Pachtman,
424 U.S. 409 (1976); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).

63.
64.
65.
66.

Cooney, 792 P.2d at 1293.
Id.
Id.
Id.

67. Id. Wyoming Statutes section 7-13-401(a)(x) (1987) defines probation as "a
sentence not involving confinement which imposes conditions and retains authority in

the sentencing court to modify the conditions of the sentence or to resentence the
offender if he violates the conditions."
68. Cooney, 792 P.2d at 1293-94 (citing Smith v. State, 598 P.2d 1389, 1391 (Wyo.

1979)).
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to sentencing considerations. 9 The court further noted that if allegations of probation violations arise, either a state probation and parole
officer or a county attorney should notify the court. 0 Expanding upon
a prior Wyoming Supreme Court holding, the court stated that "[t]he
supervision of probation, through his probation officers (and, we
would add, the county attorney) is one of the most important duties
performed by the trial judge. 7 1 The court therefore rejected Cooney's
claim that his criminal proceedings had ended with the sentencing of
probation and concluded that retention of jurisdiction established
probation as an integral part of the judicial phase of Cooney's criminal proceeding."2
Next, the court stated that the duty to alert the sentencing judge
to possible probation violations was a vital activity of both probation
officers and prosecutors.7 The court stated that the abundance of due
process safeguards at revocation proceedings evidences their adversarial nature.74 The court therefore rejected the argument that
White's activities were not those of a state's advocate and held that
the prosecutor's activities were75 intimately associated with the judicial
phase of the criminal process.
In support, the court cited federal court of appeals decisions
granting absolute prosecutorial immunity despite varying degrees of
wrongful and intentional acts.7 6 Specifically, the court noted a Fifth
Circuit case that extended absolute immunity to state parole officers.77
Further support came from cases where state and federal probation

69. Id. at 1293; see also Wvo. STAT. § 7-13-303 (1987).
70. Id. at 1294. The addition of "county attorney" is a judicial expansion of statutory language. The expansion follows the creation of judicial probation revocation in
Knobel v. State, 576 P.2d 941 (Wyo. 1978) and found in subsequent cases such as
Gronski v. State, 700 P.2d 777, 778 (Wyo. 1985); Minchew v. State, 685 P.2d 30, 31
(Wyo. 1984) and Smith, 598 P.2d at 1390. However, the prosecutor is not mentioned in
Wyoming Statutes section 7-13-408(a) (1987): "If the state probation and parole officer
determines that consideration should be given to retaking or reincarcerating a probationer who allegedly has violated a condition of probation, then that officer shall notify
the court."
71. Cooney, 792 P.2d at 1294. The court was expanding upon Smith, 598 P.2d at
1391. Id.
72. Cooney, 792 P.2d at 1294.
73. Id. at 1295.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1295-97; see Casey-El v. Hazel, 863 F.2d 29 (8th Cir. 1988); Marx v.
Gumbinner, 855 F.2d 783 (11th Cir. 1988); Barr v. Abrams, 810 F.2d 358 (2d Cir.
1987); Joseph v. Patterson, 795 F.2d 549 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1023
(1987); Williams v. Hartje, 827 F.2d 1203 (8th Cir. 1987); Meyers v. Morris, 810 F.2d
1437 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828 (1987); McCarthy v. Mayo, 827 F.2d 1310
(9th Cir. 1987); Campbell v. Maine, 787 F.2d 776 (1st Cir. 1986); Henderson v. Lopez,
790 F.2d 44 (7th Cit. 1986); Hamilton v. Daly, 777 F.2d 1207 (7th Cir. 1985); Demery v.
Kupperman, 735 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir. 1984); Lerwill v. Joslin, 712 F.2d 435 (10th Cir.
1983); Daniels v. Kieser, 586 F.2d 64 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 931 (1979).
77. Cooney, 792 P.2d at 1297 (referring to Farrish v. Mississippi State Parole Bd.,
836 F.2d 969 (5th Cir. 1988)). Contra Ray v. Pickett, 734 F.2d 370 (8th Cir. 1984);
Galvan v. Garmon, 710 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1983).
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officers were granted absolute immunity for activities involved in
preparation and submission of presentence reports. 7 8 The Cooney
court listed reasons supporting absolute immunity for presentence activities and stated those reasons also supported absolute immunity
grants to the preparation of petitions to revoke probation.7" The court
used the allegory of the prosecuting attorney functioning as an arm of
the sentencing judge for the benefit of the court, and reasoned that
the challenged activities were integral to the criminal process and deserving of absolute immunity.8 0
Justice Urbigkit, in dissent, accepted the majority's utilization of
the Imbler "functional analysis" as being the proper test to determine
whether White's actions were within the absolute immunity umbrella.8 1 According to Justice Urbigkit, accepting the allegations as
true requires a finding that White committed perjury and conspiracy.8 2 The holding of the majority, Urbigkit stated, allows a prosecutor to commit perjury and conspiracy in the guise of performing
prosecutorial functions and is therefore an unacceptable result."3
Justice Urbigkit, in examination of Wyoming probation statutes
providing for revocation, noted that while it is not prohibited, there is
no requirement that a prosecutor become involved in the revocation
process, and therefore, the revocation proceeding should be characterized as neither judicial nor adversarial. 4 In addition, the dissent
pointed out that Cooney's revocation concerned alleged violations of
conditions, an event functionally monitored by probation officials and
upon which probation officers may report directly to the court; an official duty to be performed by White was not shown to exist.8 5 According to Justice Urbigkit, the petition to revoke probation was not factually shown to have been filed by the prosecutor and it was
"impossible to determine whether a mailman could have equally
". The disserved the same function as performed by White. . .""
sent's argument appears to be that White may have been acting
78. Cooney, 792 P.2d at 1298. For cases involving federal probation officials, see
Dorman v. Higgins, 821 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1987); Spaulding v. Nielson, 599 F.2d 728
(5th Cir. 1979). For cases involving state officials, see Turner v. Berry, 856 F.2d 1539
(D.C. Cir. 1988); Demoran v. Witt, 781 F.2d 155 (9th Cir. 1985).

79. Cooney, 792 P.2d at 1298. The reasons listed by the court are (1) the nature of

the function performed; (2) the impossibility of guaranteeing the accuracy of the information to be reported; (3) the existence of routine adversary review and judicial scrutiny of the reports. Id.

80. Id.

81. Id. at 1304 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting).

82. Id. at 1305.
83. Id. at 1303.

84. Id. at 1307-08. The dissent noted that while Cooney's revocation was a judicial
procedure, it was based upon an administrative petition to revoke and there is only a
statutory implication that a county attorney represents the probation department officer when that office has the responsibility for revocation. Id; see also Knobel, 576

P.2d at 943.

85. Cooney, 792 P.2d at 1308 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting).

86. Id.
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outside of any functional role as prosecutor, precluding the grant of
immunity. The lack of information available to the court made it improper, according to Urbigkit, to grant a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim."7
ANALYSIS

The pride of Anglo-American democratic principles has been the
tenet that no man is above the law.88 This belief supports the language of 42 U.S.C. section 1983 that "color of office" creates no civil
immunity for unlawful acts. Judicial expansion of absolute immunity
is creating a growing list of public officials immune from suit in section 1983 actions.89 The holdings in Imbler and similar cases state
that the tenet remains true, despite judicially created absolute immunity from civil liability, due to the existence of criminal and disciplinary alternatives available to punish prosecutorial abuses.90 However,
punitive and disciplinary alternative actions do not occur with the frequency of civil actions seeking damages for wrongful acts of public
officials."' The wronged citizen has little incentive to pursue criminal
and disciplinary alternatives, and in many cases, like Cooney, where
the prosecutor has offered no defense to allegations of criminal conduct, the judiciary fails to advocate those charges and bar associations
react passively to the misconduct." The judiciary, above all, should be
able to see that abuses of power are not adequately addressed by
these alternative remedies. Until federal or state legislatures enact explicit limits upon official immunities, the judiciary must necessarily
monitor and control intentional wrongdoing by prosecutors claiming
immunity.
The original cloak of civil immunity was provided to ensure the
independence necessary for the proper exercise of discretion required
of a judge.9 3 In its grant of absolute prosecutorial immunity, the Imbler Court declared that the immunity was necessary to the proper
performance of the prosecutor's duties "essential" to the judicial system." The phraseology of the Imbler analysis, immunizing activities
87. Id.
88. Kinports, Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Cases: The Unanswered Questions, 23 GA. L. REv. 597, 610-11 (1989).
89. For an excellent comment on official immunity, see Comment, Federal Officers-Scope of Immunity from Damage Actions Available to Administrative Agency
Officials, 30 RUTGERS L. REv. 209 (1976).
90. Cooney, 792 P.2d at 1298 n.7 (citing Imbler, 424 U.S. at 429).
91. Cooney, 792 P.2d at 1309 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting). Scholastic examinations
reveal few instances of disciplinary actions, such as disbarments, reprimands, or filing
of criminal charges, by either the judiciary or the professional associations. See B.
GEzSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 13, at vii-ix (1989); Steele, Unethical Prosecutors and Inadequate Discipline, 38 Sw. L.J. 965 (1984); Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutorsand Trial Judges, 50 TEx. L. REv. 629 (1972).
92. Cooney, 792 P.2d at 1309.
93. Bradley, 80 U.S. at 347.
94. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427.
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that are "intimately" associated with the criminal process, likewise
implies a restraining caveat that attempts to limit immunity to "essential" functions rather than optional ones." The Imbler Court's
footnote language continues the implied restraint by reference to activities "required" of the prosecutor to properly evaluate and present
a criminal charge.8 "
Many courts emphasize the limitations on the scope of absolute
immunity. Judge Learned Hand, sitting on the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, stated that the purpose of absolute immunity was
to protect the function of the prosecutor as a "key" participant in the
criminal process.97 Even the Wyoming Supreme Court's language that
a district attorney's acts that are "intrinsic" elements of the
prosecutorial function are deserving of absolute immunity implies a
limitation on absolute immunity."
The Cooney court's application of absolute prosecutorial immunity to White's involvement in the probation revocation procedure is a
dilution of the implied limitations used by past courts when granting
absolute immunity." White's involvement was not imposed upon him
by his office.'0 0 The majority's language lacks any mention of imposed
duties and fails to explain how White could be a key participant while
performing a nonessential activity, suggesting that the Cooney court
does not recognize any implied limitations.
The Cooney court has taken a long stride towards, and perhaps
beyond, the implied limitation with a finding that White's actions
were "intimately associated" with the criminal process. The split
court in Cooney evinces a growing dispute over the priority of a citizen's right to redress wrongs, and the proper application of absolute
immunity necessary01to ensure the diligent performance of a prosecutor's official duties.
95. Id. at 430.
96. Id. at 431 n.33.
97. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
949 (1950).
98. Blake, 651 P.2d at 1102.
99. See Yaselli, 12 F.2d at 404; Griffith, 146 Ind. at 122, 44 N.E. at 1002.
100. The Park County court could have ordered White to supervise Cooney's pro-

bation under Wyoming Statutes section 7-13-301 (1987); however, the record before
the court contained no evidence of such an order, nor was there a showing that White
signed the petition to revoke. Cooney, 792 P.2d at 1308 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting).
101. For a partial review of scholastic writings generally disapproving of the modern trend of judicially applied immunity, see Beerman, Government Official Torts and
the Takings Clause: Federalism and State Sovereign Immunity, 68 B.U.L. REv. 277

(1988); Blackmum, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights-Will

the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rcv. 1 (1985); Brennan, State
Constitutions and the Protections of Individual Rights, 90 HAnv. L. REv. 489 (1977);
Eisenberg & Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L.
REv. 641 (1987); Gildin, Immunizing Intentional Violations of ConstitutionalRights
Through JudicialLegislation: The Extension of Harlow v. Fitzgerald to Section 1983
Actions, 38 EMORY LJ. 369 (1989); Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights
Legislation, 50 MiCH. L. REv. 1323 (1952); Jaron, The Threat of Personal Liability
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The nature of probation revocation should be determined by reference to the character of its procedure rather than the character of
the parties involved. 102 According to Wyoming probation statutes, although prosecutorial action is not prohibited, the disposition of
Cooney's revocation could have been accomplished without judicial
participation and would have been dismissed in an administrative
hearing, based on the facts before the court in Cooney. 0 s Prior to
1978, Wyoming probation revocation was statutory and required an
administrative hearing.' In 1978, the Wyoming Supreme Court judicially created a nonstatutory probation revocation procedure that bypasses the normal administrative hearing.105 The judicial revocation
only supplements the statutory procedure; it does not replace it. 0 1 If
the legislature has seen fit to provide greater protection of a probationer's conditional freedom, then the action of the judiciary in
abridging that protection by eliminating the administrative hearing
seems contrary to public policy.
Before 1978, court involvement was predicated upon the findings
of an administrative hearing. 10 7 The statutory revocation implies the
involvement of a prosecutor, but does not make it a requirement.108
Either statutory or judicial probation revocation can be accomplished
with or without prosecutorial activity, and therefore White's actions
should not be simply labeled "intrinsic" or "intimate" with the probation revocation because White chose to present Mayor's revocation
petition to the court.10 9
White's election to bypass the administrative hearing should not
Under the Federal Civil Rights Act: Does it Interfere with the Performance of State
and Local Government?, 13 URn. 1 (1981); Schwartz & Mahshigian, In the 1990's the
Government Must be a Reasonable Person in its Workplaces: The Discretionary
Function Immunity Shield Must be Trimmed, 46 WASH. & LEE L. R1v. 359 (1989);
Zagrans, "Under Color of" What Law: A Reconstructed Model of Section 1983 Liability, 71 VA. L. REV. 499 (1985); Comment, Oregon's DiscretionaryInterpretationof Discretionary Immunity, 22 WML.AMETTE L. Rav. 147 (1986).
102. See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 348 (1879); see also Blake, 651 P.2d at
1102.
103. WYo. STAT. § 7-13-408 (1987).
104. Cooney, 792 P.2d at 1308 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting).
105. Knobel v. State, 576 P.2d 941 (Wyo. 1978).
106. Id. at 943. The Knobel court stated that the statutory revocation requirements only apply "to cases wherein the probation or parole agent seeks to have the
probationary retaken or reincarcerated for violation of the terms of his probation or
conditional release, and has no application unless such proceedings are instituted by
that department." Taken literally, this statement would appear to require statutory
proceedings in Cooney, in light of the allegations that probation officer Mayor prepared the revocation petition based upon condition violations. Id.
107. Cooney, 792 P.2d at 1308 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting).
108. Wvo. STAT. § 7-13-408 (1987).
109. Cooney, 792 P.2d at 1308 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting). The initiation of revocation was based upon a failure to report and an unauthorized move, and was presented
in an administrative department petition to revoke; these circumstances have previously been handled entirely by the statutory revocation procedure, evidencing the less
than "intrinsic" nature of the prosecutor's role in Cooney's revocation. Id.
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transform an administrative procedure into a judicial one.1"' The record before the Cooney court contained no evidence that White was
under a judicial duty to supervise Cooney's probation."11 Although
such supervision could be exercised by a prosecutor, Cooney's probation supervision was performed by state probation and parole officers. 112 Cooney's revocation was premised upon a violation of probationary procedures and conditions, a subject normally dealt with
administratively by probation officials, rather than additional violations of Wyoming law that would call for a prosecutor's
involvement. 8
It has been recognized that the doctrine of absolute immunity applies to those legal officials whose duties are deemed "integral" to the
operation of the judiciary, and those duties are limited to regular and
normal advocacy functions. " The record before the Cooney court
provided no official papers prepared by White; the accepted allegations state only that White requested the use of knowingly false statements and presented Mayor's petition to the court." 5 The accepted
allegations that Mayor requested advice from White as a prosecutor
indicate that White used his office as a means to secure the false petition and subsequently have Cooney jailed for thirty-eight days.'"
There was nothing in the record to suggest White's judicial participation was
official action, let alone a duty "imposed" upon him by his
17
office."

It can be argued that the general advisory function performed by
White is being protected to ensure the diligent and fearless pursuit of
justice. However, after Cooney pleaded guilty to the State's charge,
the essential and traditional function of the prosecution in presenting
the State's case was finished." 3 Cooney was under close administrative supervision by probation department officials who were fully entitled to procure a probation revocation without a prosecutor's assistance. 1 9 Each of the above arguments drives White's actions further
and further from the essential or regular duties of State's advocate. As
the gap widens, the grant of absolute immunity should require a more
detailed examination into whether supporting public policies apply.
110. See Robinson v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 918 (2d Cir. 1987).
111. Cooney, 792 P.2d at 1288. The allegations accepted as fact by the majority
point out that Cooney was under supervision of the Wyoming Department of Probation and Parole; no mention is made of White's judicial obligation concerning the monitoring of Cooney's probation. Id.

112. Id.
113. Id. at 1289.

114. See Murphy v. Morris, 849 F.2d 1101, 1105 (8th Cir. 1988).

115. Cooney, 792 P.2d at 1289.
116. Id.
117. Id. The most one can glean from the allegations is that Mayor sought advice

from White and that White, as prosecutor, advised Mayor to prepare a revocation peti-

tion using false statements. Id.
118. Id. at 1288.
119. See Wyo. STAT. § 7-13-408 (1987).
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The "functional analysis" should not be conducted mechanically.
The narrow holding in Imbler resulted in the creation and acceptance
of a broad "functional analysis" that requires an inquiry into the common law immunity afforded prosecutors and the public policies supporting the immunity, as applied to a particular function.120 The supporting background of absolute immunity suggests three main
concerns that call for the application of absolute immunity to certain
prosecutorial functions.' First, the proper administration of justice
requires that the officer be free from fear of personal liability for acts
requiring the exercise of discretion.12 2 Second, the time spent in defending damage suits would prevent the prosecutor's performance of
other duties necessary to the justice system.12i Third, the impossibil-

ity of a prosecutor to produce verifiable proof when much of his information is based upon conflicting information and the veracity of witnesses.12' A full consideration of these policies should determine the
application of common law absolute immunity to prosecutors when
considering the Imbler "functional analysis. ' 5
In Cooney, the majority appears to have mechanically applied the
Imbler functional language, relying too heavily on other court holdings as precedence in defining the scope of prosecutorial immunity
available in Wyoming.126 The public policies mentioned above are
valid reasons for granting absolute immunity to most functions within
the scope of prosecutorial duties, but prosecutors are not afforded absolute immunity merely because their functions are within the scope
of official duties.12 7 Prosecutors are granted absolute immunity when
the loss of protection would result in a derogation of the prosecutor's
ability to perform the protected function. 2 8 The Cooney court failed
to adequately address this consideration in light of the facts surrounding White's actions.
Administrative acts are often based on documented information
and are commonly given qualified immunity due to a lesser degree of
required discretion and the reduced difficulty in meeting the standard
of qualified immunity.'2" The Cooney probation revocation was based
on an administrative petition which, in turn, was based on information that should have been documented and easily produced."'0 A
prosecutor with knowledge of this documented proof would have no
120. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 421.
121. Cooney, 792 P.2d at 1290 n.3. The majority lists six policies supporting abso-

lute immunity. These can be condensed due to a degree of overlap. Id.
122. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 423-24.

123. Id. at 425.

124. Id. at 425-26.

125. Id. at 421.
126. Cooney, 792 P.2d at 1295.

127. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-31; Cooney, 792 P.2d at 1292.
128. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 424.
129. Economou v. United States Dep't of Agric., 535 F.2d 688, 696 n.8, vacated on
other grounds sub nom. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1976).
130. Cooney, 792 P.2d at 1289.
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reason to fear a liability suit even if granted only a qualified immunity. 8 1 Under a qualified immunity White would have been granted
summary judgment with a minimal showing of probable cause, resulting in a de minimis effect upon the performance of normal and necessary prosecutorial functions. Balanced against the need to protect the
citizen from prosecutorial abuses of power, the policy concerns underlying absolute immunity lose much of their support in Cooney.
It is unlikely that the grant of qualified immunity to certain
prosecutorial activities would chill the performance of essential duties
if the grant were restricted to judicial revocation proceedings based on
administrative petitions. Prosecution of criminal charges, as well as
necessary pre-trial activities, would remain fully within the absolute
immunity umbrella. Thus limited, the grant of qualified immunity imposes no civil liability upon honest prosecutors and provides a partial
replacement of the legislative protections lost in judicially created revocation. More importantly, a genuinely wronged citizen can seek redress and provide a more certain restraint on isolated power abuses by
prosecutors.
CONCLUSION

The real problem with undefined absolute immunity limitations is
that public policy concerns calling for able and active criminal prosecutions are in constant conflict with public policies calling for compensation of intentionally wronged persons and controlling abuses of
governmental power. The absence of explicit legislative action places
the burden upon the courts to strike an effective balance. The modern
trend of mechanically extending absolute immunity by reference to
the duties of prosecutors, "integral to the judicial phase of criminal
process," based upon the narrow Imbler holding and its broad analysis
criteria, does a disservice to the very public absolute immunity is supposed to benefit. The Cooney decision exposes the failure of a perfunctory analysis to provide for reasonable limits on the scope of absolute immunity. The result in Cooney under qualified immunity may
not have changed, but a simple showing, by White, of good faith or
simple error, could have told the Wyoming public, and prosecutors,
that the integrity of the judicial system would be balanced with concerns for the protection of civil rights. By exercising its judicial discretion and granting qualified immunity, the court could have either
summarily exonerated White or provided redress to Cooney. All the
public is left with after Cooney is a broadening distrust of the judiciary due to its unwillingness to provide a check on prosecutorial
powers.
LOREN JOSEPH RICHARDS

131. Qualified immunity requires only a showing of good faith or probable cause,
such as supplementary affidavits or documents, summary judgment then being proper

even if the action performed was in error. See supra note 25.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1991

15

